

Figure 3. AK-74M with GP-25.




Figure 4. GP-30 under-barrel grenade launcher.

six-shot 40mm hand-held grenade launcher that fills the intermediate position between tripod-mounted automatic grenade launchers and under-barrel launchers. Originally known as the 6G-30, it is now advertised as the RG-6.

With a practical rate of fire of 15–18 rounds a minute, the RG-6 far outperforms its single-shot cousins. The 5.7kg RG-6 resembles a revolver, with the cylinder (or cassette) rotated by a spring.

It also features a self-cocking trigger mechanism and a sliding stock (combat length .78 meter, travel length .57 meter). The maximum effective range is 400 meters, while the GP-30 has a sighting range of 380 meters.

The Russians noted that South Africa's MGL-6 had a slower rate of fire, because the fired casings had to be manually extracted, and claimed that their VOP-25 grenade was three times as effective as the South African one.

But they felt that the most important advantage of the RG-6 over the MGL-6 was that for the same weight, the Russian weapon was made entirely of steel and did not malfunction if it was dropped.

Two RG-6 grenade launchers were used by the Russian army during the first incursion into Chechnya in 1994. Since then, small numbers of the weapon have worked their way into service, and the RG-6 is being heavily promoted for export sales, but with the designation of 6G-30.

Some fans claimed that this grenade launcher could have reversed the outcome of the March and April 2000 ambushes of the Moscow and Perm OMON columns in Grozny.

In early May 2000, a Russian TV program reconstructed the Grozny ambushes. They had set up six wooden targets representing Chechen fighters carefully concealed behind ruins or inside buildings, making them all inaccessible to the flat trajectory fire of the small arms carried by OMON troops. One soldier hit all the targets in 10 seconds with six shots from the grenade launcher. Two of the targets received direct hits from above, while the rest were sprayed by numerous fragments.

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## Using Tactical Decision Games To Study Tactics

SUBMITTED BY CAPTAIN FRANK W. BREWSTER II

The use of tactical decision games (TDGs) to train leaders is not new; the technique can be traced back at least to the Chinese general and military theorist Sun Tzu, who was advocating their

use 500 years before the birth of Christ. Today the TDG has assumed new importance in allowing leaders to develop and sharpen their tactical skills without an extensive commitment of resources.

To be sure, experience is one of the most valuable aspects of teaching, but it is also often costly in terms of lives and materiel. The tactical and military history instruction, readings, and digital data bases available to most officers and noncommissioned officers today provide an opportunity to capitalize on the successes, and failures, of earlier warriors, and prepare our future leaders to derive the maximum benefit from participation in TDGs. In the United States, wargames have been widely enjoyed by both military and civilian

devotees of the art for decades, and are now being used to complement smallgroup instruction at the Infantry School.

The tactical decision game shown here—TDG 1-01—is the first of a series that will be run in *Infantry* Magazine. A solution to each TDG will be found toward the back of the magazine.

Recognizing, however, that there are

many ways to approach a problem, we are not limiting the student to one passor-fail school solution. Discussions of this and other possible solutions can be found at the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate web site at <a href="http://www.benning.army.mil/CATD/TDGs/index.htm">http://www.benning.army.mil/CATD/TDGs/index.htm</a>.

## TDG #1-01 LIGHT INFANTRY ATTACK OF A RIDGELINE

## Situation—

You are the commander of A/2-87 IN (L) consisting of three rifle platoons, an AT section, a mortar section, and a headquarters element. You are Javelin/240B equipped, and are 100% on personnel and equipment.

For the past two weeks, your battalion has faced strong attacks from a regimental sized enemy light infantry element that managed to cross the Pecos River (northwest of Hill 122 off sketch). Since this was the last significant barrier between U.S. forces and the enemy, our division commander committed our brigade to block the penetration. Our battalion, as a supporting effort, is to seize a ridgeline that overlooks the river to facilitate the brigade (–) attack on the enemy's bridgehead. Hill 122 marks the start of this ridgeline. The battalion commander's intent is to destroy all crew-served and AT weapons, control key hilltops on the ridge, and pass the brigade (–) unhindered along Axis White (which runs to the NW through CPs 2, 3, & 5—CP 5 is to the northwest off of the sketch).

Your battalion has twice failed to seize the ridgeline in earlier attempts the past two days. Since the other companies were a bit weakened from their assaults, the commander has chosen your company to lead this attack. You are to seize the high ground vicinity Hill 122 to secure a foothold in order to facilitate the battalion's seizure of the rest of the ridgeline and pass the brigade main attack.

You are the lead element in the battalion's movement and have priority of fires for FA. The DS artillery battalion (105mm) completed a 15-minute suppression mission on the objective in preparation for your assault. Anticipating a fierce fight based upon B Company's experiences yesterday, you transition into bounding overwatch as you cross Schiller's Bridge over the Bullfrog River. Your lead platoon makes it nearly to the marker atop Hill 122 when it comes under automatic weapons fire from the south.

The battalion commander calls for a Sitrep and informs you that C Company started taking mortar fire east of Schiller's Bridge.

## REQUIREMENT—

Take 12 minutes to develop the orders you would pass to your subordinates. Include guidance for supporting arms and a sketch of your plan. Then provide a brief explanation.

